Lessons from Chhattisgarh By Prakash Singh

Lessons from Chhattisgarh
By Prakash Singh
(29th May 2013 Indian Express)

The Maoists have struck again in Chhattisgarh on May 25, ambushing the Congress parivartan rally in Bastar and inflicting no less than 28 casualties. Those killed included Mahendra Karma, the architect of the Salwa Judum movement, and Nand Kumar Patel, state Congress chief. About 50 people are said to have been injured.

The attack would have jolted the central and state governments which were turning complacent on the Maoist front. This was because the number of districts under Maoist influence, according to the ministry of home affairs, had shrunk to 173. The prime minister, addressing the state governors on February 12, 2013, claimed that the geographical spread of left-wing extremism was showing a shrinking trend. Besides, the number violent incidents had shown a sharp decline, dipping from 1,760 in 2011 to 1,415 in 2012, while the casualties of security forces had come down from 142 (2011) to 114 (2012).

The number of civilians killed in Maoist violence had also decreased from 469 in 2011 to 301 in 2012. Besides, the Maoists had suffered considerable attrition in their top leadership. Of the 16 members in its politburo, two had been killed while another seven were in custody; and in the 39-member central committee, 18 had been neutralised, five killed and 13 in custody. The Maoists were in some kind of a tactical retreat. The Maoist leadership was obviously under tremendous pressure to demonstrate its strength by staging a dreadful attack — which is what they did in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh.

Mahendra Karma had been targeted earlier also, and he was a sworn enemy of the Maoists.  Salwa Judum, of which he was the founder and inspiration, had posed a formidable challenge to the existence of Maoists in Chhattisgarh. The movement was demonised through orchestrated propaganda of the Maoist sympathisers, but the fact remains — and it was borne out by the National Human Rights Commission also — that it symbolised popular resistance against the excesses and aggressions of the Maoists. Realising the gravity of the challenge, the Maoists and their sympathisers launched a two-pronged attack. At the ground level, the Maoists overran the Salwa Judum camps, massacring its followers and, at the propaganda level, the so-called human rights activists launched a vicious campaign to run down the movement. The Supreme Court was also misled into giving a judgment for the disbanding of the organisation. Salwa Judum was as good as extinct, and now with the annihilation of Mahendra Karma, we would have witnessed its cremation also.

Rahul Gandhi is said to have asked, during his recent visit to Raipur, where did the responsibility lie for such a tragedy. The truth is that both the central and the state governments have been derelict in the matter. The country has been facing this problem for the more than four decades, but the central government has yet to draw up a strategic plan to deal with the Maoist threat. The prime minister said more than once that Maoist insurgency is the biggest challenge to India’s internal security, but ironically no comprehensive plan was ever drawn up to tackle it. More than 60 years after Independence, we still have no national security strategy, no internal security doctrine, no anti-terror policy and no long-term plan to tackle the Maoist insurgency. Every government that comes to power formulates its own responses depending upon its own political philosophy and considerations of expediency.

Shivraj Patil as home minister prepared a 14-point plan, which remained a paper exercise and never took off. The Maoists took full advantage of his “brothers and sisters” approach. Chidambaram came up with a simplistic and yet pragmatic approach with his “clear, hold and develop” policy. The affected areas were to be cleared of Maoists, the administration was to thereafter establish itself, and that was to be followed by a period of sustained economic development. Chidambaram moved paramilitary forces in strength in the affected states and was about to go hammer and tongs against the Maoists. However, even while the campaign was picking up, Digvijay Singh stepped in to restrain him and advised him to concentrate on economic development. There is no problem with emphasis on economic development, but the Congress high command could not appreciate the simple fact that development works could be executed only after the Maoists had been cleared from an area and the administration established its presence in the region. One interpretation was that Digvijay Singh did not want to see Chidambaram turning the corner on the Maoist front, lest he became a contender for the prime minister’s throne. Whatever may have been his motivation, the Congress shackled the home minister and its ripple effects were seen down to the battalion level. The commanders in the field were not sure if the government was keen on offensive operations and if something went wrong, even though there was nothing mala fide, they would be defended. Most of the paramilitary officers were content to hold the ground they had been sent to. Another major factor which contributed to weakening the security forces’ operations was the absence of co-ordination between the Centre and the states. Ironically, the Centre had the best co-operation from Chhattisgarh and the least from Bihar.

The state governments’ lackadaisical approach to enhance capabilities of their civil and armed police components also blunted the sharpness of the operations against Maoists. Unfortunately, we have chief ministers who are very conscious of law and order being a state subject and resent any perceived invasion of that turf by the Centre, but when it comes to dealing with the internal security challenge of Maoists, they always give the impression that it is a national problem and therefore the central government is responsible to deal with it and provide the necessary forces and the wherewithal. The experience of Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and even Tripura clearly bears out that it is the state police which has to bear the brunt of the battle and until it does that the tide would never turn. The central paramilitary forces can only play a supporting role.

The Maoist problem actually requires a long-term strategic plan with a holistic approach of the government. All departments — revenue, planning, forest, et al — will have to make their contribution. The Maoist challenge is much more than a law and order problem.

The writer is a former police chief and currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board.