It is
hardly surprising that the Abbottabad Commission of Enquiry report on the
May 02, 2011 attack successfully eliminating Osama bin Laden (OBL) should
finally have surfaced through an Al Jazeera leak, a good six months after
it had been submitted to the Pakistani government but deemed a `classified’
document in January,2013.
Constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1956 in June, 2001 by a
beleaguered PPP government `desperate to distance itself from the
disaster’, only after a joint Parliamentary resolution demanded it, the
Commission had serious teething problems. Justice (retd) Javed Iqbal, then
senior most sitting judge of the Supreme Court expressed willingness to
head it only if approved by Chief Justice Iftekhar Chaudhry, who was
apparently not consulted initially. Another eminent judge, Justice (retd)
Fakhruddin Ebrahim backed out on flimsy grounds. The Supreme Court Bar
Association and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) criticized its
composition. Ultimately, it was set up with four members including retired
diplomat Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Lt Gen(retd) Nadeem Ahmed and retired Punjab
Police IG, Abbas Khan, who eventually declined to sign the report. Ms.
Nargis Sethi, then Cabinet Secretary was made Member Secretary.
The 338 page report revealed by Al Jazeera refers to 201 witnesses whereas
earlier media reports in Pakistan suggested it was a 700 page report
examining more than 300 witnesses. It traces the events leading up to the May
01 night attack by US seals on the two storey premises in Abbottabad ,
where Osama bin Laden stayed with his two wives and extended family from
2005 onwards. It accepts OBL’s presence in Pakistan since 2002, first in
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, then in Swat and also that of his
family members, in Karachi safe houses.
In a surprisingly scathing indictment, it concludes that Pakistan’s
Military and political leaders `collectively displayed a degree of
incompetence and irresponsibility which was truly breathtaking’ and the
`worst failure since 1971’. There was `extensive complacency, inefficiency
and negligence’ not only of local civil administrative, police or military
officials `but comprehensive and sustained failure of intelligence and
security agencies’ in not being able to detect OBL’s presence. It unerringly
flags the historical course of civil- military relations in the country as
a contributory factor, blaming the `military’s exercise of authority in
policy and administration, for which it neither had constitutional or legal
authority, nor necessary expertise and competence’. It holds it
“unnecessary to specifically name them (those responsible) because it is
obvious who they are”, though adding that “it may be politically
unrealistic to suggest punishments for them (!)”. It suggests `grave complicity
at an undetermined level’ for this `collective failure of the military,
political and civil administration’.
The Commission examined several senior officials during its 18 month
existence including the then Interior and Defence Ministers, field commanders
of the Pakistan Air Force and the Director General, Inter Services
Intelligence. The Prime Minister, President or Army Chief did not depose
before it. The Commission records the remarkably candid admission of
helplessness by Defence Minister, Ahmed Mukhtar in influencing any matters
of Defence policy because of the pervasive superiority of the Military in
such matters.
The Commission did not find conclusive evidence of any deliberate
complicity on part of ISI officials but did not rule out possibility of
support by rogue elements within or plausible denial of such support
outside formal structures of the Intelligence establishment. The deposition
of Lt Gen Shuja Pasha, former DG, ISI brings out tellingly how it had to
perforce take on Counter Terrorism responsibilities though this was not
part of its charter of duties specified in 1975. Civilian agencies like the
Intelligence Bureau or the local police just did not measure up. Pasha
blames Musharraf for handing over High Value Targets like Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and Khalid bin Attash too quickly to the United States before the
ISI could interrogate them thoroughly. He laments the lack of trust which
developed between the ISI and the CIA. According to him, `American
arrogance knew no limits in its dealings with Pakistan’. Though opining
against civilian control of ISI, Pasha grudgingly supports the need for
political initiatives to invest legal cover for intelligence agencies.
Examining defence preparedness in the context of the US air raid, the
Commission rues `the India focus’ of Pakistan’s security mandarins and
`defence capabilities designed and developed for one front conflict,
ignoring the `less important’ western border. Air Defence on the
Western sector remained in ` peacetime mode’- the PAF radars were` neither
jammed nor switched off’ but were just not capable of detecting US aircraft
having stealth capabilities.
Among recommendations for the future, the Abbottabad Commission cautions
against a revival of the Army’s Green Book ideology of too pervasive a role
and suggests instead, `honest, competent and consultative’ leadership to
democratically enunciate `a national security policy, establish a National
Security Council and bring in comprehensive intelligence and police
reforms. It also advocates `dismantling of terrorist infrastructure’ which
has had such deleterious `blow back effects’ on the security establishment
in recent years. Far from remaining a whitewash, the report has the
potential to redefine civil military relations and help stabilize the
democratic process in Pakistan.
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